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TESTING THE COMPATIBILITY OF PSYCHOANAYSIS AND 
CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE: FREUD BETWEEN SPINOZA AND 
KANT  
Micheal Mack, University of Durham, England. 
 
1. Between Spinoza and Kant: Catherine Malabou, Freud, Damasio and Žižek 
 
What is Spinoza’s insight then? That mind and body are parallel and mutually 
correlated processes, mimicking each other at every crossroad, as two faces of the 
same thing. That deep inside these parallel phenomena there is a mechanism for 
representing body events in the mind. That in spite of the equal footing of mind 
and body, as far as they are manifest to the percipient, there is an asymmetry in 
the mechanism underlying these phenomena. He suggested that that the body 
shapes the mind’s contents more so than the mind shapes the body’s, although 
mind processes are mirrored in body processes to a considerable extent. On the 
other hand, the ideas in the mind can double up on each other, something that 
bodies cannot do. If my interpretation of Spinoza’s statements is even faintly 
correct, his insight was revolutionary for its time but it had no impact on science.
1
  
 
With these sentences Antonio Damasio—one of the leading contemporary neurologists—
attempts to summarize the groundbreaking significance of the seventeenth century 
philosopher Baruch Spinoza for twenty-first century neuroscience. In the paragraph 
above Damasio focuses on Spinoza’s thought about the interdependence between mind 
and body. Contrary to Descartes who allocated a commanding or ruling function to the 
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mind—which he physiologically tried to locate in the pineal gland—Spinoza argued that 
mental images originate in bodily perceptions and sensation. Spinoza famously argued 
that the mind is the idea of the body. This implies a parallelism between mind and body. 
Damasio and other leading neurologists have discovered that body, brain and mind are 
intricately connected, that bodily emotions are the foundation of mental feelings and a 
sense of consciousness: 'The inescapable and remarkable fact about these three 
phenomenon—emotion, feeling, consciousness—is their body relatedness.'2 As Damasio 
points out in the paragraph above, Spinoza insight into the parallelism between mind and 
body groundbreaking though it was ‘had no impact on science’. In Spinoza and the 
Specters of Modernity I have shown that his thought has had significant—albeit 
marginalized—repercussions with political, historical, cultural, biological and 
psychoanalytical theory. Freud in particular developed his notion of ‘new science’ as part 
of Spinoza shift away from the Cartesan but also Kantian idealist notion of the mind’s 
autonomy or full control over merely bodily or contingent external events. This Freudian 
shift in the understanding of the science of the mind will be discussed in the following 
section of this article.  
Do we do justice to Freud when we characterize him as a covert Spinozist? As we 
shall see below he was certainly highly critical of Kant’s perception of the mind’s 
autonomy from external or pathological exposures. On the hand the identity of body, 
emotion, feeling, brain and mind which Spinoza as well as contemporary neuroscience 
maintains has troubling implications for Freudian psychoanalysis too. Slavoj Žižek—
perhaps the most important contemporary Freudian/Lacanian theorist—has recently 
raised a red flag over what he call the reductive materialism of neurologists à la Damasio. 
Žižek’s point of contention is a self-proclaimed progressive one: the neurologists 
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  Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: body, emotion and the making of consciousness, 
(London: Vintage, 2000), p. 284.  
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abandon a Kantian position and retreat to a ‘naïve’ pre-critical perception of life. Poking 
fun at Damasio, Žižek articulates his 'problem with this easy and clear solution: reading 
the cognitivists, one cannot help noting how their description of consciousness at the 
phenomenal-experiential level is very traditional and pre-Freudian.
3 Later on Žižek makes 
clear that he actually understands pre-Kantian by his expression ‘pre-Freudian’. Here it is 
important to attend to what Žižek refers to as ‘this easy and clear solution’. Without 
referencing her new book The New Wounded: From Neuroscience to Brain Damage, 
Žižek mentions Catherine Malabou—whose work on Hegel he keeps appraising—for 
having advocated a dismissal of Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalysis in favour of 
contemporary neuroscience:  
 
Only with today’s brain science do we have the true revolution, namely that, for 
the first time, we are approaching a scientific understanding of the emergence of 
consciousness. Catherine Malabou draws a radical consequence from the 
cognitivist standpoint: the task is not to supplement the Freudian unconscious 
with the cerebral unconscious, but to replace the former with the latter—once we 
accept the cerebral unconscious, there is no longer any space for the Freudian 
version.
4
   
  
As we will see, Malabou does not advocate abandoning Freudian psychoanalysis. She 
does, however, take issue with the Kantian residue of the mind’s autonomy within 
Freud’s writing and thought. It is this critique of an idealist unconscious in Freud’s 
conscious and outspoken attack on Kant’s notion of a mind that is in full possession of 
itself, which provokes Žižek’s censure of Malabou’s position. Rather than doing justice 
to Freud’s complex position between Spinoza and Kant, Žižek reads Freudian 
psychoanalysis as if it were another version of Kantian autonomy. His fondness of 
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paradox brings Žižek to declare that radical Cartesian (Descartes’s cogito) and Kantian 
(Kant’s autonomy) idealism coincides with the radical materialism of Marx, Lenin and 
Stalin. For both pure idealists and pure materialist, there is no such thing as matter, brain, 
mind or selfhood. Rather than being embodied (as Spinoza and contemporary 
neuroscience maintains) we are disembodied, substance-less subjects: minds or organs 
without bodies. This insight into the non-substantial or non-corporeal foundation of 
human existence is what Žižek understands by ‘Freudian’. It is actually not Freud but 
Hume and Kant as he makes clear later on: 'while Hume endeavours to demonstrate how 
there is no Self (when we look into ourselves, we only encounter particular ideas, 
impressions, etc.—no ‘Self’ as such), Kant claims that this void is the Self.'5 The 
emptiness of the empirical or embodied self serves as the foundation of Kantian 
autonomy. On account of the self’s void, it is able to disregard empirical, embodied and 
contingent conditions of the merely natural (i.e. non-rational) world and legislate in an 
autonomous manner.  
The self’s void justifies the rule of a mind that is here even more radically than in 
Descartes’s cogito completely independent of corporal or material conditions. This 
independence from matter establishes the mind’s autonomous rule over the material or 
embodied world. As Žižek has put it: 'The post-Humean critical-transcendental idealists, 
from Kant to Hegel, do not return to the pre-critical, rock-like, substantial identity of the 
Ego—what they struggled with was precisely how to describe the Self which has no 
substantial identity (as was stated by Kant in his critique of Descartes’s own reading of 
cogito as res cogitans “a thing that thinks”), but nonetheless functions as irreducible 
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point of reference—here is Kant’s unsurpassable formulation in his Critique of Pure 
Reason: “[…] Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is 
represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts=X”.'6  According to Žižek, 
neuroscience returns to a pre-Freudian position, because his understanding of the pre-
Freudian, is the pre-Kantean or Spinozan (critical of both Descartes’s and Kant’s 
autonomy of the thinking thing). Kant has emptied thought of any substance. In his 
critique of the material vestiges of Descartes’ cogito he has banished the matter implicit 
in the Cartesian notion ‘res cogitans’: 'Kant thus prohibits the passage from ‘I think’ to ‘I 
am a thing that thinks’: of course there has to be some noumenal basis for (self-
)consciousness, of I must be ‘something’ objectively, but the point is precisely that this 
dimension is forever inaccessible to the ‘I’.'7 The inaccessibility in question here is 
epistemological. Kant’s epistemological critique sets the stage for his metaphysical 
redefinition of the body. Given that we do not know the possible meaning of our 
embodiment, it also could not be said with certainty that bodily contingency has any 
relation to a transcendent ground that would bestow on it some form of value. Our non-
empirical, that is to say, rational activity operates as the true source of moral validity.  
Kant’s idealism does not deny the existence of matter but maintains that matter 
has any right to exist except as the material base for the mind’s autonomous 
constructions. Precisely because the intrinsic value of matter is inaccessible the mind can 
rule it without restrictions. The scandal of Spinoza mind-body parallelism and that of 
contemporary neuroscience is that here corporeal matter is no longer inaccessible to 
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mental insight but on the contrary, here the very survival of the mental depends on the 
corporeal materiality.  
This brings us to the precarious existence of the mind, according to contemporary 
neuroscience. The dependency of the mind on the body has serious implications for the 
mental longevity, because the mind is subject to corporeal mortality. In her new book, 
Malabou focuses on precisely this issue. She argues that cerebral plasticity does not only 
denote the donation and reception but also the destruction of life. She does not dismiss 
Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalysis—as Žižek claims she does. She asks, however, 
whether Freudian thought can imagine the mortality of psychic life.  
Addressing the question of whether Freud allows for the radical negativity of 
death as part of mental life, Malabou first points out that psychoanalysis defines mental 
illness not in terms of mortality but in terms of regression: 
 
Freud thus underscores two fundamental characteristics of psychopathologies: 
They always entail both regression and destruction, and they only destroy that 
which stands in the way of regression. Destruction only bears upon the “later 
acquisitions and developments” that Freud compares to a garment or envelope. 
These superstructures are thus designed to cover over the essential—the nature 
that breaks through our “hard-won morality”—the nudity of the primitive psychic 
stratum, which becomes the aim of regression. Destruction is merely the most 
effective manner of uncovering or revealing the indestructible.
8
  
 
The indestructible is not death but the death drive. The death drive never comes to end 
but turns around death returning to primitive pasts of childhood and the evolutionary 
beginnings of humanity before the stage of restrictive mental life, of civilization. 
According to Freud, the psyche operates in an autonomous manner, because it works as 
7 
an inward drive, progressing and regressing ontogenetically to the childhood of a given 
individual as well as polygenetically to the savage origins of mankind, to the murder of 
the primeval father by the brothers who envy their progenitors exclusive possession of 
women. Oedipus is itself a regression to this primal scene of savage patricide. Nothing 
seems to get lost in psychic life: over human history the same events keep returning. This 
is what Malabou means by Freud’s indestructibility of the psychic life. This 
indestructibility sharply contrasts with contemporary neuroscientific findings of the 
mind’s dependence on bodily growth and mortality. The brain of an Alzheimer patient 
does not regress to childhood. On the contrary rather than growing like a child, it 
incrementally closes down and retreats from an affective engagement with the outside 
world. As Malabou shows in her book, Freud vehemently denied that psychic life could 
shut down and cease to exist. From this perspective Freud clings to a notion of autonomy; 
psychic autonomy:  
 
The psychical regime of events, for Freud, is autonomous; it does not 
depend on any organic causes—especially not upon any cerebral cause. 
This autonomy manifests itself precisely through the independence of 
fantasmatic work whose only creative resources come from the psyche and 
not the brain. Once again, the concepts of scene, fiction, and secanario are 
foreign to any neuronal organization that, according to Freud, does not 
possess an apparatus of representation.
9
   
 
The brain, according to contemporary neuroscience, engages in work of representation. 
These representations are not full representations of the objects concerned. They are 
creations: 'But the correspondence is not point-to-point, and thus the map need not be 
faithful. The brain is a creative system. Rather than mirroring the environment around it, 
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as an engineered information-processing device would, each brain constructs maps of that 
environment using its own parameters of internal design, and thus creates a world unique 
to the class of brains comparably designed.'
10
 These different and divergent 
representations of the world constitute part of our subjectivity and create difference of 
perspective, different take on things. At first glance Freud, on the other hand, seems to be 
close to Žižek’s image of him: he seems to dismiss any talk of material, embodies objects 
as irrelevant to the autonomy of psychic life. There is no such thing as external reality, 
only the hallucinations and fictions generated by the void which is psychic life: “The gap 
that separates the quantum level from our ordinary perceived reality is not a gap between 
ultimate hard reality and a higher-level unavoidable-but-illusory hallucination. On the 
contrary, it is the quantum level which is effectively ‘hallucinated,’ not yet ontologically 
fully constituted, floating and ambiguous, and it is the shift to the ‘higher’ level of 
appearance (appearing perceived reality) that makes it into a hard reality.”11 Our sense of 
‘hard reality’ is itself a product of fiction whose basis is psychic life. This makes Freud 
appear as a Kantian who transposes Kant’s notion of autonomy into the workings of the 
psyche. How can we then account for Freud’s repeated criticism of Kant’s philosophy? 
 
2. Freud’s New Science 
 
Indeed Freud defines his new science against Kant’s modernity. Freud ironically 
characterizes Kant’s Copernican revolution as ‘old science’. What makes it old is its 
presumption of intra-human omniscience and omnipotence. Contra Kant, Freud argues 
that we are not masters in our own house. Instead our ego or our psyche is split into 
competing claims and commandments of which we can rarely gain control. Significantly, 
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Freud undermines the Kantian notion of autonomy as mastering one’s own house and 
world, when he locates the psychoanalytical revolution within the historical context of 
both Copernicus and Darwin: both have inflicted wounds on humanity’s narcissism. 
Psychoanalysis deals a third and decisive blow to this kind of anthropomorphism: 
 
Humanity had to endure two big wounds of its naïve self-love as inflicted by 
science over the ages. First when it learned that our earth is not the center of the 
world, but a tiny part of a much bigger and unimaginable system of the world. 
This wound is associated with the name of Copernicus, although Alexandrinian 
science has pronounced something similar. The second: when biological science 
rendered null and void the presumed privilege of creation of man by referring to 
both his descent from animals and to the inerasable nature of his animalistic 
constitution. This reevaluation has taken place in our time under the influence of 
Charles Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors [i.e. Spinoza, Herder, and 
Goethe], which have been met not without the fiercest resistance of their 
contemporaries. The third and most severe wound, however, human megalomania 
has to endure from psychological research, which proves to the ego
12
 that it is not 
even master in his own house, but remains dependent on pathetic information 
derived from something which takes place unconsciously in the life of its soul.
13
 
 
Here Freud clearly places his new science in a historical trajectory of maverick scientists 
who have radically rejected humanity’s anthropomorphic conception of God.  
The Copernican revolution has questioned the quasi-divine place of the earth as 
the center of the universe and Darwin and his predecessors Spinoza, Herder, and Goethe 
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vorgeht.' Freud, Studienausgabe, vol. 1, ed. Alexander Mitcherlich, Angelika Richards, and James 
Strachey, (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1975), pp. 283-84. My trans. 
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have shown how humanity forms part of natural rather than exclusively spiritual history. 
The most severe wound to humanity’s anthropomorphic concept of God and the universe 
is, however, inflicted by Freud’s new science. Why is this so? The preceding revolutions 
had to do with the strictly biological (Darwin) and astrological (Copernicus) spheres, 
while minimally touching upon the sphere of the mind. This is why Kant is part of the 
Copernican revolution: with Copernicus he acknowledges the periphery of the 
astrological position of our habitat, the earth, but he nevertheless reclaims the 
autonomous mastery of humanity within its post-Copernican limits (i.e. the limits of the 
sublunar world).  
Freud’s new science is radical, because it assaults this last remaining bastion of 
pride: the mind. Rather than guaranteeing the proud independence of humanity from 
natural forces, the mind is ‘not master in his own house but remains dependent on 
pathetic information derived from something which takes place unconsciously in the life 
of its soul’ (see larger quote above). This indefinite ‘something’ (von dem, was) makes 
nonsense of any claim to an unambiguous self-knowledge. It therefore strongly 
undermines the Kantian position concerning transcending the empirical world, because of 
the autonomy of the rational mind.  
According to Kant, reason shapes the material world in an a priori manner and, as 
a result, is capable of freedom from natural conditions.
14
 In Freud’s Introductory Lectures 
of 1933 Kant appears as the godfather of philosophers who argues that “time and place 
are necessary forms of psychic activities.”15 Far from being able to create stable spacial 
structures and temporal rhythms, the mind easily turns mindless when it removes the ego 
from the flow of time and also from the flow of life. This removal from time and space  
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might be substantiated by a loss of reality which characterizes various forms of 
psychosis. 
  In undermining Kant’s conception of autonomy, Freud’s new science refashions 
Spinoza’s critique of both religion and philosophy as anthropomorphism. As Suzanne R. 
Kirschner has pointed out, Freudian psychoanalysis analyzes “the limitations of 
modernity’s emphasis on rationality and autonomy.”16 Freud’s new science enmeshes 
cultural with natural history. According to Freud we cannot overcome nature and attain 
Kant and Hegel’s state of freedom where natural impulses are suspended. Psychoanalysis 
focuses on damages caused precisely by such suspension. Rather than emphasizing a 
future state of reason and freedom, Freud’s new science tries to persuade us to 
commemorate a ‘savage’ (i.e. pre-modern) past which, if not brought to consciousness, 
determines our presumably modern and civilized way of life.  
 
3. The death drive 
 
The focus on human savagery, on aggression, and self-destruction are certainly far 
removed from Spinoza’s universe where suicide does not come naturally, but is instead 
the offspring of external societal factors. As Spinoza puts it in the third Part of the Ethics, 
'whatever can destroy our body cannot be in it.'
17
 Clearly Freud is cognizant of the 
negativity, which Herder and Goethe have introduced into Spinoza’s seemingly benign 
naturalistic universe. It is worthwhile adding that there already is an epistemological 
negativity in Spinoza, which, as analyzed by Alain Badiou, focuses on the void that 
separates our finite human understanding from the infinity of God or Nature.
18
 What 
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Hegel and Herder have introduced into Spinozist thought is a further radicalization of this 
void. It now turns from the merely epistemological into the ontological sphere. Spinoza, 
in contrast, denies that any being 'has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or 
which takes its existence away.'
19
  
The issue of an ontological negativity has, to be sure, been reinforced by Charles 
Darwin’s notion of natural selection, based not on the principle of merit but rather on that 
of arbitrariness, chance, or, in other words, tough luck. 'We behold the face of nature 
bright with gladness,' writes Darwin and goes on to stress nature’s dark side, 'we often 
see superabundance of food; we do not see or we forget, that the birds which are idly 
singing around us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; 
or we forget how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by 
birds and beasts of prey; we do not always bear in mind, that, though food may be 
superabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring year.'
20
 In Darwin’s work 
Spinoza’s principle of self-preservation ceases to be co-operative while it is of course still 
entirely naturalistic: “He who believes in the struggle for existence and in the principle of 
natural selection, will acknowledge that every organic being is constantly endeavouring 
to increase in numbers; and that if any one being varies ever so little, either in habits or 
structure, and thus gains an advantage over some other inhabitant of the same country, it 
will seize on the place of that inhabitant, however different that may be from its own 
place.'
21
 Here the preservation of the self feeds on the weakness of others. Darwin 
account is Spinozist in so far as it thoroughly naturalistic. His description of nature lacks, 
however, any ethical component and is thus removed from Spinoza’s social agenda in his 
Ethics. Freud seems to intensify this naturalistic bleakness when he discusses the death 
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drive: 'A strange drive,' he exclaims, 'that is bent on the destruction of its own organic 
home!'
22
 Distinguishing his approach from that of Schopenhauer, Freud argues that far 
from being opposed to life, the death-drive is actually the very foundation of our ability 
to survive. This supports Malabou thesis according to which Freud’s notion of psychic 
life is immortal. The death drive only turns deadly if it has been cut off from an 
organism’s erotic circulation to which it originally belongs. This reliance on the corporal 
organism contradicts Žižek’s take on psychoanalysis in terms of Kantian radicalisation of 
Descartes’ cogito. As Malabou has shown 'Freud dismisses any suggestion that an 
organic cause could have etiological autonomy.'
23
 In this way he denies that mental 
illness can ever result from injury to the organ of the brain. His denial of the etiological 
autonomy of an organic cause does, however, not mean that Freud invalidates the 
significance of organic, material and embodied life and the psyche’s interaction with the 
external world. Malabou does justice to Freud when she emphasizes he 'in no way 
minimizes the importance of external threats or perils.'
24
 Oedipal fantasies and anxieties 
of castration refer back to substantial and embodied events such as the trauma of 
separation taking place at birth and the baby’s dependence on parental support later on: 
'Castration anxiety (the third form of separation) is itself a substitute for the fear of 
punishment—punishment by the mother who threatens to withdraw her love for the child 
(the second form of separation); and this punishment anxiety, in turn, it the expression of 
an even older anxiety linked to the trauma of birth (the first from of separation).'
25
 The 
paradoxical position of the death-drive—confirming life while driving beyond it—results 
from the deeply ambiguous situation of embodied life from birth onwards. 
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4. Freud’s Spinoza shift 
The death-drive certainly forms part of the libido and as such it is life preserving. In this 
way, Freud speaks of 'the way in which the two drives [i.e. of life and of death] 
interconnect and how the death-drive is placed at the services of Eros.'
26
 This 
intermingling of the constructive and destructive represents another shift within a 
Spinozist conception of an interconnected universe. The name Spinoza seems to be 
conspicuous by its absence in Freud’s oeuvre: most of the time he refers to him 
indirectly. This absence of a direct reference to Spinoza points to the indirection or, we 
may say, the shift that Spinoza’s thought is capable of inspiring. Freud only directly 
addresses his debt to Spinoza when he is asked to do so. In this way the Spinozist Dr. 
Lothar Bickel requested of the late Freud an acknowledgement of his intellectual reliance 
of Spinoza. Freud’s reply is affirmative:  
 
I readily admit my dependence on Spinoza’s doctrine. There was no reason why I 
should expressly mention his name, since I conceived my hypotheses from the 
atmosphere created by him, rather than from the study of his work. Moreover, I 
did not seek a philosophical legitimation.
27
 
 
The term atmosphere is of course rather vague. What Freud seems to have in mind is 
what he has in common with Spinoza, namely, being affiliated while at the same time 
being disaffiliated with the contemporaneous Jewish community and with Jewish history. 
Both Freud and Spinoza are double outsiders: they are not part of their own community 
in terms of religious affiliation though they are perceived as Jews by the non-Jewish 
majority of their respective societies; being seen as typically Jewish they are 
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automatically associated with the threatening, the savage, or, in Spinoza’s case, the 
Satanic. This perception of their ethnicity is then reinforced through the content matter of 
their writing and thought, which undermines in different but nonetheless related ways the 
anthropomorphic conception of God or, in Freud’s words, humanity’s megalomania.    
 In his letter to Bickel Freud downplays the way in which he was an actual student 
of Spinoza work. As a later communication makes clear, this lack of systematic study 
does not mean that he was not shaped by Spinoza’ thought. While declining to contribute 
to a volume dedicated to Spinoza’s three hundredth anniversary, Freud nevertheless 
emphasizes his intellectual debt to the Dutch Jewish philosopher: 'Throughout my long 
life,' he writes, 'I [timidly] sustained an extraordinarily high respect for the person as well 
as for the results of the thought [Denkleistung] of the great philosopher Spinoza.'
28
 Here 
Freud implicitly conceives of Spinoza not as single and isolated figure; rather he sees in 
the name Spinoza an intellectual constellation of thinkers and writers who from Lessing, 
Herder, and Goethe to Darwin have introduced various shifts in the way we see 
humanity, not as a quasi-divine representative on earth, but as deeply enfolded within the 
material realm of nature.  
It may well be that it is due to this non-definable and super-individual influence of 
Spinoza’s work that Freud avoids mentioning his name in his various psychoanalytical 
studies. Freud sometimes alludes to Spinoza by referring to Heine as his non-religious, 
paradoxically co-religionist (Unglaubensgenossen).
29
 This is precisely the term Heine 
employs in order describe his affinity with Spinoza. Significantly Heine focuses on 
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  Quoted from Yovel, Spinoza and other Heretics, p. 139. German original in S. Hessing (ed.), 
Spinoza-Festschrift, (Heidelberg: Karl Winter, 1932), p. 221. See also S. Hessing’s “Freud’s Relation with 
Spinoza,”  in Hessing’s Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977, (London: Routledge, 19977), pp. 224-39 and J. 
Golomb’s “Freud’s Spinoza: A Reconstruction,” Israel Annals of Psychiatry 16 (1978): 275-88.  
29
  Freud call Heine a Unglaubensgenossen in the Future of an Illusion, Studienausgabe Vp. 9, p. 
183. And in his monograph on Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious he quote the Heine excerpt 
where Heine uses the term Unglaubengenosse as synonym for Spinoza: “‘Mein Unglaubensgenosse 
Spinoza’”, sagt Heine”, Freud Studienausgabe Vol. 4, p. 75.  
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Spinoza’s critique of anthropomorphism in both philosophy and theology. Heine is often 
ingenuously right by saying something that is blatantly wrong. He does this when he 
claims that Spinoza never denies the existence of God but always the existence of 
humanity. Implicitly contradicting the seventeenth and eighteenth century charge of 
atheisim and the twenty-first century appraisal of Spinoza as atheist, Heine writes:  
 
Nothing but sheer unreason and malice could bestow on such a doctrine the 
qualification of ‘atheism.’ No one has ever spoken more sublimely of Deity than 
Spinoza. Instead of saying that he denied God, one might say that he denied man. 
All finite things are to him but modes of the infinite substance; all finite 
substances are contained in God; the human mind is but a luminous ray of infinite 
thought; the human body but an atom of infinite extension: God is the infinite 
cause of both, of mind and of body, natura naturans.
30
 
 
What Heine refers to in this important quotation is precisely the topic on which I want to 
focus the discussion of encounters between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: namely, the 
shift Spinoza introduces away from thought centering on the human to one centered upon 
nature. Freud reinforces this shift when he distinguishes his new science from the 
presumptuous claims of both religion and philosophy. By grounding the psyche in an 
organic natural context, Freud is not so far removed from a neuroscientific approach as 
Žižek in his critique of Malabou would make us believe.  
 
5.  Freud’s Spinozist critique of theology and philosophy 
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  Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany, trans by John Snodgrass, (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1986), p. 72. “Nur Unverstand und Böswilligkeit konnten dieser Lehre das Beiwort 
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Modi der unendlichen Substanz. Alle endliche Dinge sind in Gott enhalten, der menschliche Geist ist nur 
ein Lichtstrahl des unendlichen Denkens, der menschliche Leib nur ein Atom der unendlichen 
Ausdehnung; Gott ist die unendliche Ursache beider, der Geister und Leiber, nutura naturans.” Heine, 
Schriften über Deutschland, ed. By Helmut Schanze, (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1968), p. 95.  
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We can better understand Freud’s conception of his ‘new science’ by attending to his 
polemics against religion. In a highly ironic manner Freud argues that religion renders 
God anthropomorphic by endowing humanity with quasi-divine powers. As has been 
discussed above, Freud clearly characterizes his new science as an affront to Kant’s 
conception of an autonomous mind that is capable of shaping his own world and history.  
Why does Freud, despite his nineteenth century background in anthropological 
evolutionism (i.e. Frazer and Tylor), base his conception of psychoanalysis on the non-
progressivist footing of lack (or incompletion) and the insufficiency of civilization and its 
morals (or on aggression and savagery as the original foundation of morals and 
civilization)?  
 To address this question it is worth drawing attention to Eric L. Santner’s brilliant 
discussion of a sense of “too muchness” in Freud’s writing and thought. The 
confrontation with this topic stipulated the composition of Santner’s On the 
Psychotheology of Everyday Life. Here Santner speaks of his 'sense that Freud’s mostly 
negative assessments of religion are in some way undermined or at least challenged by 
what I can’t help but characterize as the ‘spiritual’ dimension of the new science he 
founded.'
31
 This 'spiritual dimension' is precisely the encounter with not only a 
physiological but also a psychic energy of excess (or too muchness): 
 
Psychoanalysis differs from other approaches to human being by attending to the 
constitutive “too muchness” that characterizes the psyche; the human mind is, we 
might say, defined by the fact that it includes more reality than it can contain, is 
the bearer of an excess, a too much of pressure that is not merely physiological. 
The various ways in which this “too much,” this surplus of life of the human 
subject seeks release or discharge in the “psychopathology of everyday life” 
continues to form the central focus of Freudian theory and practice. Now the very 
religious tradition in which Freud was raised, his protestations of lifelong 
secularism notwithstanding, is itself in some sense structured around an internal 
excess or tension—call it the tension of election—and elaborates its particular 
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  Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 8.  
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form of ethical orientation to it. For Judaism (as well as for Christianity), that is, 
human life always includes more reality than it can contain and this “too much” 
bears witness to a spiritual and moral calling, a pressure toward self-
transformation, toward goodness.
32
 
 
This excess is paradoxically humanity’s limitation: it is so overwhelmed by various 
pressures and conflicting demands that it is incapable of mastering its own house. This 
sense of “too muchness” splits the ego apart into at least three incompatible force fields: 
one is the demand to attend to the hardship imposed by external reality (what Freud calls 
Lebensnot),
33
 the second are the realms of aggressive or sexual drives (the so called id) 
and the third, equally overwhelming and potentially destructive, are the valid, but 
sometimes non-significant, moral imperatives imposed by civilization (the superego).  
In his works on religious history, Freud attempts to show how the superego or 
civilization itself derives from the aggression and obscenity of the drives, of the id. 
Instead of a narrative of progression here we clearly have an account of how qualitative 
leaps emerge only thanks to what they apparently oppose and into what they could easily 
regress yet again. According to Freud, civilization begins not with the promulgation of 
moral doctrines but with the murder of the primeval father by his sons, who are so 
envious of his exclusive sexual possession of women that they kill him in a fit of rage. 
How is murder responsible for morality? It gives rise to a sense of guilt. The excessive 
demand of psychic and physiological drives thus gives way to the too much of self-
destructive feelings of guilt. As Santner puts it in the excerpt quoted above, it is due to 
this excess of guilt that we attempt to be “good.” 
This sense of goodness, however, can easily turn into an anthropomorphic 
conception of God: through our moral consciousness we may feel identical with God. In 
this way religion does not bring about humility but megalomania. So Freud’s critique of 
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  Ibid.  
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  Freud, Studienausgabe . Vol. 9, p. 186.  
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religion is in fact a Spinozist one that criticizes human self-aggrandizement. The specter 
of anthropomorphism looms large when Freud argues that religious folk are the most 
hubristic imaginable because they feel at one with the limitless power of God. According 
to Freud religious folk: 
 
give the name of ‘God’ to some vague abstraction which they have created for 
themselves; having done so they can pose before all the world as deists, as 
believers in God, and they can even boast that they have recognized a higher, 
purer concept of God, notwithstanding that their God is now nothing more than an 
insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine. 
Critics persist in describing as ‘deeply religious’ anyone who admits to a sense of 
man’s insignificance or impotence in the face of the universe, although what 
constitutes the essence of religious attitude is not this feeling but only the next 
step after it, the reaction to it which seeks a remedy for it. The man who goes no 
further, but humbly acquiesces in the small part which human beings play in the 
great world—such a man is, on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the 
world.
34
  
 
Freud argues that it is not an awareness of humanity’s insignificance but a sense of its 
consubstantiation with the divine that characterizes religion. He makes it clear that his 
way of thinking here is idiosyncratic, if not ironic. This is so because we usually define 
religious character in the opposite manner: not in terms of anthropomorphically 
occupying the place of the divine but, on the contrary, in terms of accentuating human 
lack in the face of God or nature. According to Freud, in contrast, this sense of lack or 
incompletion shapes, not the world view of religion, but that of science.  
 
Freud’s notion of science is indeed new; not least because it reverses the role 
traditionally attributed to religion with that of his ‘new science’. Here we encounter the 
opposite of a triumphal narrative of progression, Freud’s ‘new science’ focuses on our 
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lack of self-mastery: it proves that we are not even masters of our own house. 
Radicalizing Spinoza’s analysis of the self as being intrinsically bound up with the other, 
Freud denies that we are unified entities. Rather than forming a consistent whole our 
psyche is torn by a whirlpool of excessive demands, commands, and urges. It is due to 
this internal strangeness or, in other words, this experience of being overwhelmed by 
competing drives and desires and aspirations that it is so difficult for us to take account of 
what is actually happening in the external world. Psychic illness results from an overflow 
of internal pressures so that the ego cannot see anything in its environment but an 
intensification or mirror image of its mental conflicts. This is of course what Spinoza 
criticizes as anthropomorphic distortion of nature or God according to the life of our 
internal appetites or passions. This distortion is nothing else but a psychotic loss of reality 
where we cannot accurately assess our self as being interconnected with the world 
external to the self. This loss of coordination between self and other brings about 
destruction as self-destruction. As Malabou has pointed, psychoanalysis focuses on the 
point where the distinction between internal and external danger collapses; where the 'ego 
doubles itself, and this scission opens the psyche to the horizon of its own 
disappearance.'
35
 Freud attributes equal significance to the materiality of the external 
world as he does to the immateriality of psychic life. The material presence of the 
external world is the Spinozan heritage of psychoanalysis. It is from this corporeal or 
material Spinoza perspective, that Freud criticizes the loft aspirations of Kantian moral 
philosophy. 
In his Ethics Spinoza provides a philosophical guide for sustainable integration of 
the self within the world at large. According to Spinoza we achieve this coordination 
through the realization that we are part of what is ostensibly not us (this is the third kind 
of knowledge or the intellectual love God). According to Freud 'truth consists in the 
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agreement with the actual external world.'
36
 Spinoza tackles the passions and appetites 
and Freud attends to the surreal reality of various drives and hyper-moral commandments 
in order to prepare for an accurate perception of the actual world surrounding us. 
Spinoza’s passions and Freud’s various libidinal urges and demands cause a distorted or 
anthropomorphic reading of nature or God. Significantly the two thinkers take these 
distortions seriously. They do so, because the loss of reality brought about by the 
passions nevertheless shapes the life of human society. According to Spinoza reason has 
to collaborate with the passions if it wants to change social practices. Rather than 
imposing a categorical framework upon the affects, Spinoza encourages us to conduct an 
ethical life that is not at war with the passions but makes use of their constructive rather 
destructive potential. In a similar vein, Freud’s new science criticizes the deleterious 
effects of a morality that attempts to destroy the passions. This attempt at destruction is in 
actuality self-destructive. Both Freud and Spinoza undermine the quasi-divine status of 
moral commandments. Spinoza shows how our understanding of good and evil reflects 
our appetites and so we call that good what we desire and evil what we loathe. These 
categories therefore reflect our psychic and physiological state but they distort the object 
that they are supposed to denote.  
In Spinozist fashion, Freud’s ‘new science’ questions 'morality which God has 
presumably given to us.'
37
 Morality as gift from God is of course an anthropomorphic 
construct. Significantly Freud sees anthropomorphism operative not only in religion but 
also in philosophy; and that nowhere more than in Kantian moral philosophy. To 
illustrate his discussion of an anthropomorphic deity as foundation of morality, Freud 
refers to Kant’s famous parallelism between the mind and the starry heavens above: 
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22 
 
Following the famous sentence by Kant who connects our conscience with the 
starry heavens, a pious person could be tempted to venerate the two as 
masterpieces of creation. The stars are certainly marvelous but as regards 
conscience, God has done an uneven and careless job […]. We do not fail to 
appreciate the bit of psychological truth that is contained in the claim that 
conscience is of divine origin, but the sentence requires interpretation. If 
conscience is something “in us,” then it is, however, not so from the beginning. It 
is quite a counterpart to sexual life which is really there straight from the 
beginning of life and is not added only later.
38
  
 
Rather than following Kant and becoming a pious person, Freud here follows Spinoza 
when he uncovers the morals as appetites. By turning upside down the anthropomorphic 
narrative of conscience or reason as original divine endowment, Freud ironically makes 
the untidy sphere of sexual drives into the point of origin of all human values. The excess 
of sexual drives limits rather than aggrandizes humanity’s position in the universe. 
Instead of confirming the quasi-divine status of morality, Freud naturalizes all aspects of 
human society. This naturalization is so all-encompassing that it includes the realm of 
cultural and intellectual achievements. The work of the intellect is not the offspring of a 
divine gift mirroring the sublimity of the stars. Instead it emerges from the plasticity of 
the libido. 
 Freud sees in religion the main enemies of his ‘new science’, because it does not 
allow for such an unsavory view of humanity’s intellectual achievements. He does not 
take issue with art and literature, because they do not presume to be anything else but 
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illusions. Freud’s ‘new science’ is indeed heavily indebted to works of art and literature. 
One could even say that he takes their purported illusion to be a true reflection of psychic 
reality. A striking example is of course the Oedipus complex. Freud believes in the actual 
truth of the Oedipus myth. The Oedipus myth articulates our unacknowledged desires. 
They are unacknowledged because any acknowledgment of their actuality would be an 
intolerable offence to humanity’s quasi-divine self-image (surely as images of God we 
must not have any unconscious desire to be so depraved as to want to kill our father and  
to sleep with our mother).  
Freud values art for 'not daring to make any encroachments into the realm of 
reality.'
39
 As his reading of the Oedipus myth illustrates, Freud does, however, employ 
the self-professed illusion of art for a better understanding of psychic reality. As Beverley 
Clack has recently put it, “engagement with Freud’s work is fruitful precisely because he 
takes seriously the power that phantasy has to shape one’s experience of the world.”40 
Freud’s new science is far from being positivistic in so far as it attends to dreams and 
other forms of consciousness such as religious narratives or myths that are ostensibly 
illusory and cannot be proven in any quantitative way.  
 Freud’s method, however, is empiricist: he observes the details of an 
illusory reality in a way similar to which a physicist or chemist depicts the progress of an 
experiment. The crucial point here is that Freud’s new scientist dedicates such time and 
energy to the observation of false consciousness, because it forms such a substantial part 
of our psychic condition. In Spinozist terms false consciousness is a lamentable but 
necessary ingredient of humanity. Spinoza’s rationalism consists in recognizing 
falsehood. Both Spinoza and Freud take issue with theology and philosophy, because 
                                                          
39
  “wagt sie kein Übergriffe ins Reich der Realität” Freud Studienausgabe Vol. 1, p. 588. My trans. 
 
40
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these two disciplines tend to focus on the mind’s perfection while paying scant attention 
to the where and when it makes mistakes. Psychoanalysis, instead, focuses on the mind’s 
blind spots. It is, however, not judgmental but treats mental failures as inevitable or, in 
Spinoza’s terms, necessary aspects of our humanity with which we have to reckon (rather 
to dismiss as unworthy of scientific discussion).  
Against this background it not surprising that next to the anthropomorphic 
conception of God as found in various religions, Freud discusses the discipline of 
philosophy as hostile to his ‘new science’. Like religion, philosophy proclaims to be 
promulgating nothing less than the truth. One of its illusions, however, consists in its 
claim to 'proffer an unbroken and consistent world view.'
41
 According to Freud 
philosophy’s methodology is even more questionable, because it 'overrates the cognitive 
value of our logical operation.
42
 Philosophy shares with religion the illusion of an 
omniscient quasi-divine mind. Similar to the way in which Spinoza warns against 
electing either philosophy or theology as the key to a full understanding of biblical texts, 
Freud differentiates his ‘new science’ from the lofty sphere of the pure mind as found in a 
secular form in philosophy and in a spiritual shape in religion. Rather than endowing our 
cognitive capacities with an infallible quasi-divine power, Freud asks us to be mindful of 
our mind.  
 Freud makes the mind mindful of its origination within the dark and unsavory 
sphere of the drives by attending to repressed memories. He sees a resistance to this work 
of remembrance not so much in the relatively small world of philosophy, but in the larger 
ambiance of religion, in general, and Christianity, in particular. “Philosophy, however,” 
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Freud writes, “does not have an immediate influence on a large amount of people; it only 
catches the interest of a small number and of that small number only a tiny elite of 
intellectuals; and philosophy is unfathomable for everyone else.”43 Religion, on the other 
hand shapes the life of most people. Freud takes particular aim at Christian and Jewish 
salvation narratives in which he sees the nucleus of endowing morality with a quasi-
divine force. Those who conceive of intellect and will as pertaining to God transcribe 
human values and human cognition into the sphere of Divinity. This unduly aggrandizes 
the mind. The divinization of humanity’s intellect prevents a critical engagement with the 
way the mind assists rather than checks the destructive and self-destructive life of the 
passions. Abstractions veil what is actually occurring at the interface that connects the 
cerebral with the emotive.  These abstractions precisely constitute the resistance to 
psychoanalysis. The dismissal of Freud’s new science is substantial with refusal to 
acknowledge humanity’s sexual constitution. This 'resistance to sexuality'44 results from 
an anthropomorphic conception of God, which, in turn, eventuates in an inability to 
confront the unsavory and the irrational. Freud’s psychoanalysis radicalizes Spinoza’s 
demand to be mindful of the mind. The resistance to such mindfulness originates in a loss 
of reality, where the self has assumed the omniscience and omnipotence of God.  
 The incompatibility of neuroscience and psychoanalysis is thus not to be found in 
(according to Žižek) the demoted pre-critical Spinozism of the former and the assumed 
Kantianism of the latter. As we have seen in this paper Freud does not perceive of the self 
as substance-less entity but rather he tries to evaluate when and how the subject loses a 
sense of her material conditions (the reality principle). The radical novelty of 
neuroscience consists in the potential break with assumptions of an immortal life 
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substance—be that Spinoza’s conatus or Freud’s positing of an imperishable psyche. By 
uncovering in the corporality of the brain material foundations of selfhood, contemporary 
neuroscience has also discovered the decay and mortality of the self. As Malabou has put 
it, 'The imperishable is death itself.'
45
 It is this prospect of the end which may well be the 
fourth wound inflicted on humanity’s sense of pride. Neither Spinoza, nor Darwin, nor 
Freud was ready to face up to the trauma of irrecoverable destruction.   
.   
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